CSIS Flagged a 2019 Liberal Nomination. The Candidate Stayed. Of the Briefing After the Vote, “It Appears That No Documentation Exists.”

1. The Panel of Five weighs it, and does not tell you. The Panel is made up of 5 senior public servants (the Clerk of the Privy Council, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, and the deputy ministers of Justice, Public Safety and Foreign Affairs) who may warn Canadians if an election is threatened Hogue vol. 1, p. 30. Among its 2019 members, in Hogue’s words: “Ms. Drouin, a member of the 2019 Panel,” Hogue vol. 2, p. 115 and “at least two of the Panel members, Ms. Drouin (Justice) and Monik Beauregard (Public Safety).” Hogue vol. 2, p. 116 That is “Nathalie Drouin, then Deputy Minister of Justice.” Hogue vol. 2, p. 113 The NSIA in 2019 was Greta Bossenmaier Hogue vol. 2, p. 115.

   Panel of Five · the seats in 2019

   Clerk of the Privy Council

   Not named on this page.

   Security and Intelligence Advisor

   Greta Bossenmaier

   Deputy Minister, Justice

   Nathalie Drouin

   Deputy Minister, Public Safety

   Monik Beauregard

   Deputy Minister, Foreign Affairs

   Not named on this page.

   Some members “queried whether the nomination process was more a matter for the affected political party. However, the Panel decided to consider this intelligence, nonetheless.” It asked “intelligence agencies to continue to provide it with information regarding this matter” Hogue vol. 2, p. 106. Hogue gives no date for when CSIS first told the Panel, only that it was during the election period Hogue vol. 2, p. 106; Hogue records the order: “The Panel indicated that the Liberal Party should be told,” and CSIS then briefed the party Hogue vol. 1, p. 30.
2. It “concluded that the threshold to make an announcement was not met” Hogue vol. 2, p. 106. Its reasons: the intelligence was “evolving and not firmly substantiated”; it concerned a nomination and “did not directly impact the electoral process”; and “If the candidate were elected, the party leader would be aware of the risk” Hogue vol. 2, p. 106

1. The elections watchdog can’t act either. The Panel counted on the Commissioner of Canada Elections and the party being told Hogue vol. 2, p. 106. The Chief Electoral Officer “determined that no action could be taken at that time by his office” Hogue vol. 2, p. 110. And no law made it an offence: “Canada does not criminalize interfering in nominations” NSICOP p. 30

The pattern: the people who could have told the public relied on the watchdog and the party being told, and the watchdog could not act.

1. The party is told, and checks what it can. On 28 September 2019 CSIS briefed the Liberal Party’s security-cleared representatives Hogue vol. 2, p. 106. One was Azam Ishmael, the national director Hogue vol. 2, p. 107. The party’s representative passed it to Jeremy Broadhurst, national campaign director Hogue vol. 2, p. 106, who called senior Privy Council Office officials “to see if there was additional information they could share,” but “did not ask for any specific additional information to be gathered at that point,” because he believed directing public servants would be inappropriate Hogue vol. 2, p. 107. Party officials told him “nothing stood out as abnormal” Hogue vol. 2, p. 107

1. Ishmael, in Hogue’s summary of his testimony, said it would be difficult for foreign states to interfere in the party’s nominations because the party has many security measures Hogue vol. 2, p. 107. Hogue’s finding on those measures: “not particularly stringent nor are their verification measures” Hogue vol. 2, p. 111
2. The leader is told, and keeps the candidate. Broadhurst briefed Trudeau, as party leader, at the Ottawa airport Hogue vol. 2, p. 107. He “recommended to Mr. Trudeau that no immediate action be taken” Hogue vol. 2, p. 108. His account of why the officials gave no advice: “it’s not the place of intelligence officials to make that kind of recommendation” Hogue vol. 2, p. 108. Trudeau kept Dong on the ballot. His stated reasons: “a fairly high threshold for overturning the results of a nomination contest,” and not “sufficient or sufficiently credible information to justify removing Mr. Dong” Hogue vol. 2, p. 108

1. The consequences he noted, in Hogue’s summary of his in camera testimony, whole: “Mr. Trudeau noted that not approving Mr. Dong’s endorsement would have had direct electoral consequences as the Liberal Party expected to win DVN. It would also have had a devastating impact on Mr. Dong personally.” Hogue vol. 2, p. 108

The pattern: the Panel relied on the party being told. The intelligence officials, Broadhurst said, “did not recommend that the Liberal Party should do anything in response,” and in his account advice was not their place. The party’s representatives told Broadhurst; Broadhurst asked the Privy Council Office for more and told the leader; and the leader, the only one with power over the candidacy, kept the candidate.

1. After the vote, a briefing with no record found. Hogue: “the Commission received evidence that, after the 2019 election, the Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”) requested, and received, a briefing about the reported irregularities from senior officials. It appears that no documentation exists on this.” Hogue vol. 2, p. 109 “Since then, the Prime Minister and the PMO have received additional briefings about Mr. Dong,” Hogue vol. 2, p. 109 and NSICOP cites the CSIS Director’s “Notes for DIR PM Brief: Don Valley North in the 2019 Election,” dated 8 February 2020 NSICOP p. 31, fn 213. The gap is that one post-election briefing. The Liberal Party “allowed Mr. Dong to run in both the 2019 and 2021 federal elections” NSICOP p. 31
2. The CSIS brief that was recalled. CSIS wrote a National Security Brief dated 1 October 2019, “Foreign Interference in the 2019 Federal Campaign of Dong Han” Hogue vol. 2, p. 110. It “was recalled by the then CSIS Director shortly after a discussion with the National Security and Intelligence Advisor” Hogue vol. 2, p. 111. Hogue: “Recalling a document involves asking recipients to destroy it.” “While the underlying information and reports remain available to CSIS,” the brief “is no longer accessible” Hogue vol. 2, p. 111

1. Their side: Cherie Henderson, in 2019 Director General of CSIS’s Intelligence Assessment Branch Hogue vol. 2, p. 117, told Hogue a recall “is not unusual, but (…) not regular, sort of in between.” Hogue vol. 2, p. 111, fn 51 Former Director David Vigneault “did not recall why this report was recalled”; he said a report might be recalled if, for instance, “it includes incorrect information or the report inadvertently identifies a source,” and “insisted he had never recalled a report because it was too sensitive or for political reasons.” Then-advisor Greta Bossenmaier “said she likely read the report and may have asked questions about it but did not remember asking for it to be recalled” Hogue vol. 2, p. 111. Hogue: “In the absence of any explanation for the recall, I cannot draw any conclusion from this incident, other than noting that this report was recalled” Hogue vol. 2, p. 111

1. It is not the only paper on the case: the reports cite a SITE Task Force document, “FI efforts against Dong Han” Hogue vol. 2, p. 105, fn 48, and the Director’s notes of February 2020 NSICOP p. 31, fn 213. The recalled brief is the one dated during the campaign, 1 October 2019.

The pattern: a CSIS brief on this case, dated 1 October 2019, was recalled shortly after a discussion. The Director “did not recall why,” and Hogue had no “explanation for the recall.”

1. The inquiry, across both elections: “Information that should have reached ministers and even the Prime Minister did not. I was unable to ascertain from the evidence exactly why this happened in each case.” Hogue vol. 1, p. 108 “There was no way of knowing who had received a particular report, whether those who had received it had read it and whether any action had been taken as a result” Hogue vol. 1, p. 108
2. The national security review agency: CSIS and Public Safety “did not have a system for tracking who received and read specific intelligence products, creating unacceptable gaps in accountability” NSIRA F.7. On the Panel: its “high threshold for a public announcement is unlikely to be triggered by traditional foreign interference, which typically targets specific ridings” NSIRA F.5

1. A separate dispute, in 2021: NSIRA found “disagreement between senior public servants and the NSIA as to whether intelligence assessments should be shared with the political executive,” and “the NSIA’s interventions resulted in two products not reaching the political executive, including the Prime Minister” NSIRA F.9. The NSIA’s side, as PCO gave it: the activity in one report “did not qualify as foreign interference, but was rather part of regular diplomatic practice” NSIRA. That concerns 2 2021 analytical reports on PRC interference, not the 2019 recall.
2. NSICOP wrote that a PRC network in a place its public report redacts “had some contact with at least 11 candidates and 13 campaign staffers, some of whom appeared to be wittingly working for the PRC” NSICOP p. 26. “Wittingly” is NSICOP’s word. Hogue’s response: some NSICOP findings on “witting” participation “were more definitive than the underlying intelligence could support,” and “I did not see evidence of “traitors” in Parliament” Hogue vol. 1, p. 103. The public text names no candidate. Neither do we.

The pattern, in the review agency’s words: the Panel’s “high threshold for a public announcement is unlikely to be triggered by traditional foreign interference, which typically targets specific ridings.” NSIRA F.5 On our reading, a nomination in one riding is that kind of target. And CSIS and Public Safety had no system to track who received and read their intelligence products NSIRA F.7.