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Ottawa Signed the Destroyer Contract at $8.01B. By March 2026 It Was $10.75B, and the Disclosure Gives No Reason.

On 3 March 2025, Ottawa signed Irving Shipbuilding to build the first River-class destroyers for $8.01B. For the quarter from January to March 2026, the contract disclosure reports an amendment adding $2.74B, and gives no reason. For the fleet of 15 ships, National Defence’s project page says only “Initially at an estimated cost of $56-60 billion, the cost of the full project is under review.” Asked in Parliament what it has paid Irving, Defence withheld the answer.

By Grant Levy · October 2026 · Tap any number or quote for its source · More on waste and scandals

The Irving build contract, as signed and as amended by March 2026Up $2.74B, or 34%, in one amendment. The contract disclosure gives no reason.
  1. As signed3 March 2025$8.01B
  2. After the amendmentReported for January to March 2026$10.75B
Source: National Defence, contract disclosure W847S-240156/001/CSC

Added in one amendment

$2.74B

Reported for January to March 2026. The disclosure gives no reason.

The PBO’s price for the fleet

$84.5B

To develop and build, 2022. Defence’s page, dated 3 October 2025, shows only its earlier range, “under review”.

Expense lines naming Irving, Q-417

$3.81B

Lines over a million dollars only: a floor, and not shown to be payments. Defence withheld its payments to Irving as commercially sensitive.

What they did

The River-class destroyers are the navy’s next 15 warships, to be built in Halifax to replace the Halifax-class frigates. National Defence calls the program “The RCD Initiative is the largest and most complex shipbuilding effort undertaken in Canada since the Second World War.”

On 3 March 2025, Justin Trudeau’s government signed the build contract for the first 3 ships with Irving Shipbuilding: $8,010,267,025, awarded by Public Services and Procurement Canada for National Defence. Bill Blair was Minister of National Defence and Jean-Yves Duclos Minister of Public Services and Procurement, as the ministry list of 20 December 2024 and the announcement of 8 March 2025 both show. That release said the money was “With an initial value of $8 billion (including taxes) intended to fund the first 6 years of construction.”

Contracts to Irving by March 2025

$12.87B

Design and build, before tax, as Defence’s project page gives it. That total predates the amendment.

The procurement department’s return to the House on 26 January 2026 lists the contract in one line, “2025-03-03 | $8,010,267,025 | Irving Shipbuilding | Service,” and withholds its terms: “The specific terms of this contract constitute commercially sensitive third-party information, and therefore cannot be publicly released.” It says “This contract was approved by the then-Minister of Public Services and Procurement as well as the then-President of the Treasury Board through a Treasury Board submission.” On 3 March 2025 those offices were held by Jean-Yves Duclos and by Ginette Petitpas Taylor, President of the Treasury Board since 20 December 2024. Of all the contracts the return lists, it says: “the Ministers were provided copies of the contracts and associated Treasury Board submissions, which summarized the key elements of the contracts relating to scope, cost, risk, policy implications, industrial benefits, and delivery.” The return releases neither those summaries nor this contract’s terms.

As signed, 3 March 2025

$8.01B

The build contract for the first ships, awarded by Public Services and Procurement Canada for National Defence.

On 14 March 2025, Mark Carney was sworn in as Prime Minister. For the quarter from January to March 2026, when David J. McGuinty was Minister of National Defence and Joël Lightbound was Minister of Government Transformation, Public Works and Procurement, the contract disclosure reports an amendment of $2,743,239,684. The contract’s value, a ceiling rather than what has been paid, stood at $10,753,506,709, up 34% on the value signed, by the end of March 2026.

The disclosure gives no reason for the amendment and no date it was signed, only the quarter. One more line changed. The intellectual property field read “No IP Terms in Contract” when the contract was signed. After the amendment it reads “Crown owned – exception.” The disclosure explains neither change.

The contract’s value, March 2026

$10.75B

A ceiling, not what has been paid. Reported for January to March 2026.

Up on the value signed

34%

From 3 March 2025 to the end of March 2026. The disclosure gives no reason.

On 1 June 2026, the procurement department’s Question Period note for the Secretary of State for Defence Procurement still described the contract as having “an initial value of $8 billion (including taxes).” That is accurate as written: it was the initial value. The note leaves out the $2.74B added since, and names no amendment to it.

What was being bought around then

Context from the same months. None of these documents says it is the amendment’s reason.

  1. Weapons and radar, faster. Treasury Board gave Defence $150.0M in 2025-26 for River-class weapons and radar parts: “This allocation allowed the Department of National Defence to accelerate the acquisition of the weapons and radar systems for River-class destroyers.”
  2. The next batch. Defence’s plan for 2026-27 includes this line: “Initiate the Procurement of Batch 2 Long Lead Items.”

Treasury Board, 2025-26

$150.0M

Given to Defence for River-class weapons and radar parts.

Main Estimates, 2026-27

$2.24B

What Defence asked Parliament for on the project this year.

  1. This year’s request. Defence asked Parliament for $2.24B for the project in the 2026-27 Main Estimates.
  2. The extension the release foresaw. The March 2025 release said “The initial implementation contract value is for an agreed contract period of six years, enabling the required work to be executed in that period, with a contract extension to follow as the successful construction progresses..” Whether the amendment is that extension, the record does not say.

As we read it, the money moved in public, line by line, and the reason for the amendment was not published.

The price they promised, and the fleet’s price that is not published

The fleet’s price, from the 2008 budget to the PBO’s 2022 estimateNational Defence’s page, dated 3 October 2025, still shows $56B to $60B, marked “under review”. The PBO put it at $84.5B in 2022.
  1. The 2008 budgetThen-year dollars$26.2B
  2. National Defence’s figureHigh end of its range, “under review”$60B
  3. PBO, 2017Then-year dollars$61.8B
  4. PBO, 2022To develop and build, then-year dollars$84.5B

The PBO compares National Defence’s range with its own figure to develop and build the ships; its 2022 figure removed provincial taxes that its earlier estimates included, so the bases are close but not identical. The PBO’s cost over the ships’ whole lives, $306.0B, is left off this scale so it does not flatten the rest.

Sources: the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2017 and 2022; National Defence, project page (page dated 3 October 2025)

The 2008 budget set aside $26.2B for the ships. By 2017 the Parliamentary Budget Officer put the program at $61.8B. In 2022 it put the cost to develop and build them at $84.5B, and the cost over their lives at $306.0B.

National Defence’s project page, dated 3 October 2025, still gives its earlier range: “Initially at an estimated cost of $56-60 billion, the cost of the full project is under review.” It does not say when the review began. The department’s Defence Capabilities Blueprint, modified 1 December 2025, uses the same words, and its 2026-27 Departmental Plan gives no total for the fleet. The government did put a number on the first 3 ships: $22.2B before tax. For all 15, we found no revised total in any of those records, and no costing of the ships by the Parliamentary Budget Officer since 2022, as of 15 October 2026. That absence is the finding. The people paying for the fleet have a price for its first ships, and an old range for the rest.

What one destroyer costs, by who said it and whenThe first ships come to $7.4B each before tax, against $1.75B a ship in the 2008 budget, in the dollars of each year and not adjusted for inflation.
  1. The 2008 budgetPer ship, then-year dollars$1.75B
  2. PBO, 2017Per ship, then-year dollars$4.12B
  3. National Defence’s own figurePer ship, its high end, “under review” on its page dated 3 October 2025$4.00B
  4. PBO, 2022Per ship, to develop and build, then-year dollars$5.63B
  5. The first shipsPer ship, the government’s 2025 figure, before tax$7.40B

Each program figure is divided by the fleet’s 15 ships; the government’s Batch 1 figure by its 3. The bases differ on tax: the Batch 1 figure excludes it, and the PBO’s 2022 figure removed the provincial taxes its earlier estimates included. None is adjusted for inflation.

Sources: the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2017 and 2022; National Defence, project page and 8 March 2025 release

Per ship, the first 3 cost $7.4B each before tax. The PBO’s 2022 estimate, across the fleet, works out to $5.63B a ship. The two cover different ships and different costs, so they are not the same measure, and no price for the later ships has been published.

Building before the design is done

On 16 September 2024, the procurement minister’s parliamentary secretary answered a written question in the House for the department: “the design of ships is not finalized and, consequently, construction has not commenced.” On 3 March 2025, the department signed the build contract.

On 13 March 2025, the procurement department’s note for Question Period said “the River-class Destroyer project is presently in the third of 4 design stages,” “with a goal of a full-rate production by April 2025.” Defence lists full-rate production from April 2025. Its own status report says the “design of the more complex portions of the ship (those primarily associated with the ship's combat systems) continuing through to Final Design Review, likely in 2028.”

So the build contract was signed before the design’s last stage, and full-rate production was planned to start before that stage too. It started on the first ship in April 2025. On 29 August 2025, the department’s note for the Secretary of State for Defence Procurement still said “the River-class Destroyer Project is presently in the third of four design stages.”

So the shipyard is building ships whose fighting systems are still being designed. Defence told Parliament it has already “Canada has directed Irving Shipbuilding Incorporated to cease design work on certain systems for the River-class Destroyers.” It would not say which systems, when, or what stopping cost.

In 2021 the Auditor General, working from what she called very preliminary schedules, wrote that “the first Canadian surface combatant for the Royal Canadian Navy was not expected to be delivered until at least 2030.” “Very preliminary schedules showed the last ship being delivered in 2047.” The frigates these ships replace, she found, are “the navy’s Halifax-class frigates, which will be replaced by the surface combatants, are expected to be retired sometime between 2034 and 2048.” Her conclusion: “Therefore, there is little room for further delay.” Defence’s 2026-27 plan lists first delivery in 2032-33.

Building before the design is doneFull-rate production began in April 2025, with the combat-system design running to a review likely in 2028. The Auditor General’s 2021 estimate, from very preliminary schedules, put the first ship at 2030 at the earliest. Defence now lists 2032-33.
  1. 2021, Auditor GeneralEstimate from very preliminary schedules: first ship 2030 at the earliest, last 2047
  2. 3 March 2025Build contract signed with Irving Shipbuilding$8.0B
  3. April 2025Full-rate production begins
  4. Likely 2028Final Design Review of the combat systems
  5. 2032-33First delivery, as National Defence now lists it
  6. 2034 to 2048The Halifax-class frigates the ships replace are to retire
Sources: Auditor General, Report 2, 2021, para. 2.65; National Defence, Departmental Plan 2026-27, status report on major capital projects

What Defence will not say

An MP put a written question to the government, Q-417, on what National Defence has paid on these ships. The answer, tabled on 21 November 2025: “The financial details requested constitute commercially sensitive third-party information and therefore are not publicly releasable.”

Spent, 2017-18 to 2025-26

$5.37B

Reported in the answer to Q-417.

Expense lines naming Irving

$3.81B

Lines over a million dollars only: a floor, and not shown to be payments.

The same answer reports $5.37B spent on the project from 2017-18 to 2025-26, and lists every expense over a million dollars by vendor. The lines naming Irving Shipbuilding add to $3.81B. That sum is a floor, because smaller lines are left out, and it is a sum of expenses, which the answer does not show to be payments to Irving. The payments themselves are what Defence withheld.

The stop-work orders on design went the same way. The answer confirms them and withholds their details, their delays and any replacement contracts as commercially sensitive.

What Defence told Parliament it spent, and the expense lines with Irving’s name on themIt withheld what it paid Irving. Its own table of expenses over a million dollars names Irving on lines that add to $3.81B, a floor.
  1. Spent on the project2017-18 to 2025-26, as answered on 21 November 2025$5.37B
  2. Expense lines naming Irving ShipbuildingOnly lines over a million dollars; a floor, and not shown to be payments$3.81B
Source: National Defence’s answer to written question Q-417, 21 November 2025

Who Irving met, as filed

From 17 December 2024 to 3 March 2025, Irving Shipbuilding filed 9 reports of meetings with ministers and ministers’ chiefs of staff. Each gives the same subject: “Input into the Federal Government's National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy as it relates to Irving Shipbuilding being selected on October 19, 2011 to build the Combat Vessel work package.”

So Irving registered meetings on the Combat Vessel work package, before the contract, with these offices, as filed: the procurement minister’s chief of staff, the Defence minister’s chief of staff, the associate Defence minister’s chief of staff, and the Minister of Veterans Affairs. It met the procurement minister’s chief of staff on 3 March 2025, the day the contract was signed, and again on 7 March, the day before it was announced. On 25 March 2025 it met the new Prime Minister, Mark Carney, on the same subject. These filings, registered with the Commissioner of Lobbying, record who met and what about. They do not record what was said.

Meeting reports, 17 Dec 2024 to 3 Mar 2025

9

Filed by Irving Shipbuilding, with ministers and ministers’ chiefs of staff.

Dominic LeBlanc was Finance Minister on the contract date. A compliance measure disclosed in the Ethics Commissioner’s registry on 10 February 2025 sets out his screen for matters touching James D. Irving, whom the card calls “my friend”, president and chief executive officer of J.D. Irving, Limited, covering that company’s subsidiaries, affiliates and divisions. J.D. Irving, Limited lists Irving Shipbuilding among its business divisions. The card says: “I also agree not to have any communication with government officials in relation to any matter or decision-making processes which I or my administrator know or reasonably should know to affect Mr. Irving’s interests.” It adds: “Moreover, all powers, duties and functions on matters that form part of this screen will be exercised by the Prime Minister as it relates to funding decisions and the President of the Treasury Board of Canada for all other matters.” Irving Shipbuilding’s filings from 17 December 2024 to 25 March 2025 record no meeting with Finance. The record shows the screen and the dates. It does not show he took any part.

Reports filed, June 2025 to June 2026

97

Filed by Irving Shipbuilding.

The lobbying did not stop at the contract. From June 2025 to June 2026 Irving Shipbuilding filed 97 reports, 20 of them in March 2026. From June 2025 its consultant’s registration has listed, as a grant or contribution sought: “Funding to prepare the facility for construction of the future River Class Destroyer fleet and to support the ongoing maintenance of vessels.”

From 15 January 2026, filings give that yard funding as a subject: with the procurement department’s deputy minister on 15 January; with Stephen Fuhr, Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, on 5 February; with Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne on 10 March, where it is the only subject; and with deputy ministers of the procurement, Defence, Finance, Transport and Housing departments on 31 March. Other meetings that quarter are listed here by date and office as filed: on 9 March, Fuhr again, the Navy’s commander, the President of the Treasury Board, the Clerk of the Privy Council and Industry Minister Mélanie Joly; on 10 March, the procurement minister, Joël Lightbound.

Separately, the build contract’s amendment was reported for the same quarter. No filing or disclosure connects the two. The filings record the subject and who was there, not what was said, and none says what the amendment bought.

Irving’s meetings as filed, and when the contract came and grewBefore the contract, every filing gives the Combat Vessel work package as its subject. From 15 January 2026, some filings give the yard funding. The amendment is a separate record, and no filing or disclosure connects the two.
  1. Mary Rose Brown, chief of staff to the procurement minister
  2. Ginette Petitpas Taylor, Minister of Veterans Affairs
  3. 14 and 15 January 2025Taras Zalusky, chief of staff to the Defence minister; Brown; Shawn Lawlor, chief of staff to the associate Defence minister
  4. Brown and Zalusky
  5. Brown again. The same day, the build contract is signed$8.0B
  6. Brown. The announcement follows the next day
  7. Prime Minister Mark Carney
  8. Arianne Reza, deputy minister of procurement, on the yard funding
  9. Stephen Fuhr, Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, on the yard funding
  10. Fuhr; the Navy’s commander; the Treasury Board President; the Clerk of the Privy Council; Mélanie Joly, Industry
  11. Joël Lightbound, procurement
  12. François-Philippe Champagne, Finance, whose meeting’s only subject is the yard funding
  13. Deputy ministers of procurement, Defence, Finance and others, on the yard funding
  14. January to March 2026Separately: the build contract’s amendment is reported$2.7B
Sources: Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying, Irving Shipbuilding Inc. communication reports, offices as filed; National Defence, contract disclosure

The yard Irving bid at no cost to Canada

Their side first. The officials who sought a guarantee for the shipyards after the 2011 competition called it, as the Auditor General reports, “a prudent risk mitigation measure and fair and equitable to all parties, as all three shipyards had bid $0 cost to Canada.” The auditor’s own view: “When considered on their own, given the uniqueness of the NSPS procurement process, the backstop provisions can be viewed as a reasonable way to increase certainty.” Public Services and Procurement Canada’s case for the later money is that “The infrastructure enhancements were identified during the design phase,” and that it was “provided to Irving Shipbuilding to ensure that they have the capability to construct the Canadian Surface Combatant design.” In its words, “This investment will enhance the efficiency of ship construction while improving project costs.”

The record, in order. The 2011 request for proposals scored the yard’s cost to Canada: “By bidding $0 for the cost to Canada, a bidder would receive the full 20 points.” “The three companies that bid on the project did submit bids that included a $0 net cost to Canada for their infrastructure upgrades, electing to fund these upgrades from their own resources and expected profits from future contracts.” Irving’s bid, like the others, put the net cost to Canada at $0. “The bidders chose to assume the financial risk of any needed upgrades.”

The backstop, February 2012

$300M

About this much for Irving, an amount that shrinks as work is awarded.

After Irving was selected in October 2011, it asked for a backstop. In February 2012 the signed umbrella agreement included one, about $300M for Irving, an amount that shrinks as work is awarded: “the amount payable by Canada is reduced by the value of the contracts awarded to the shipyards to design and build ships.” “Canada was under no obligation to agree to such a provision,” the auditor wrote in 2013, though “according to officials it provided a benefit to Canada, because shipyards would upgrade their facilities to achieve target state earlier than required in the RFP.” And: “Irving Shipbuilding has confirmed that it will not in the future request any further increases to the backstop.”

Irving’s yard: its cost to Canada as bid, as guaranteed, and as committedBid at $0 in 2011, backstopped at about $300M in 2012, then committed at up to $871.7M for River-class facility work. The bases differ, and the record does not say whether the last counts against the backstop.
  1. As bid2011: net cost to Canada of the yard upgrades, in every bid$0
  2. As guaranteedFebruary 2012 backstop, about, as of 2013; shrinks as contracts are awarded$300M
  3. As committed for the destroyers17 October 2024: all phases of River-class facility work, including tax$871.7M
Sources: Auditor General of Canada, Fall 2013, Chapter 3, paras. 3.35, 3.40 and 3.41; Public Services and Procurement Canada, Question Period note, 17 October 2024

On 25 May 2021 Public Services and Procurement Canada told the Public Accounts committee: “ISI has modernized its shipyard, at no cost to Canada.” On 8 August 2023 it added $463M to Irving’s design contract for yard infrastructure. By 17 October 2024 it called that the first phase of $871.7M for all phases, which left $408.7M still to flow as of October 2024. Both counts include tax. From June 2025, Irving’s consultant registered the yard funding as a grant or contribution sought.

Added 8 August 2023, first phase

$463M

For yard infrastructure, on Irving’s design contract. Counts include tax.

Committed for all phases, October 2024

$871.7M

Counts include tax.

The scope differs, and it matters. The 2011 bid and the 2012 backstop concern the upgrades to bring the yard to its target state for all its work. The later money is River-class facility work that the department says was found during design. The record does not say whether that money counts against the backstop.

Their case, first

The government’s best case, in its own words

  1. It is hard. “The revised ship delivery schedule recognizes the complexity of the RCD design and is informed by best practices and lessons learned through allies who are building variants of the same design.”
  2. Estimates move. The Defence minister’s briefing note for the question of overruns: “Initial cost and schedule estimates were based on early assumptions and best practices. Estimates are updated as the project progresses and industry benchmarks evolve.”

Jobs a year, 2025 to 2039

5,250

The 8 March 2025 release’s estimate for the build contract.

Added to the economy a year

$719.3M

The 8 March 2025 release’s estimate, 2025 to 2039.

  1. The jobs and the growth. The 8 March 2025 release estimates the build contract will add $719.3M a year to the economy and create or maintain 5,250 jobs a year, from 2025 to 2039.
  2. Asked about overruns. At the defence committee on 4 December 2025, Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay said “experience shows that the actual cost of these types of projects is often higher than the projected cost. Do you have a strategy to prevent cost overruns?” The minister, David J. McGuinty, answered, in interpretation from French: “Yes. A strategy and measures are in place. The way the department manages its finances has also been improved.” “We also need to keep in mind that these two projects create a lot of investments and a lot of jobs in Canada.” In the same meeting he told the committee “the money invested to build three River-class destroyers will contribute $719 million per year to our GDP and create 5,250 jobs per year between 2025 and 2039.”
  3. Benefits equal to the contracts. The industrial benefits policy that applies to the program “requires companies to make investments and provide business activities in Canada equal to the value of the related contracts.”

Benefits owed on the design work

$937.2M

On the 2019 design contract, from the Industry answer’s table.

Benefits achieved on it

$417.9M

From the same table, by January 2026.

  1. Who checks the benefits. Asked in the House which contracts under that rule had been audited, and whether any penalty had been issued since 2016, Industry answered on 26 January 2026: “The information requested is not systematically tracked in a centralized database.” A full answer, it said, “could lead to the disclosure of incomplete and misleading information.” Its table gives Irving’s obligation on the 2019 design contract as $937.2M, with $417.9M achieved by January 2026. The obligations run over a contract’s life. The build contract is not in the table yet.
  2. An extension was always coming. “The initial implementation contract value is for an agreed contract period of six years, enabling the required work to be executed in that period, with a contract extension to follow as the successful construction progresses.”
  3. A more efficient yard. “This investment will enhance the efficiency of ship construction while improving project costs.” “The infrastructure enhancements were identified during the design phase.”

Our read of their case, from the record

What they said about the price, and whenEach statement is accurate as written. None gives the fleet’s new total or the amendment’s reason.
  1. 2008The budget for the program$26.2B
  2. The first ships’ cost, before tax$22.2B
  3. The fleet’s cost “under review” on Defence’s page
  4. Asked about overruns, the Defence minister says a strategy is in place, then points to jobs
  5. January to March 2026The build contract’s amendment is reported$2.7B
  6. The minister’s note: estimates are updated as the project progresses
  7. The note for the Secretary of State still gives the initial value
Sources: PBO, 2017; National Defence, release, project page and briefing note; House of Commons defence committee, 4 December 2025; Public Services and Procurement Canada, Question Period note
  1. The warning came first. In 2021 the Auditor General wrote: “Therefore, there is little room for further delay.” Defence then contracted to build at full rate with the combat-system design open until about 2028, and has since ordered some design work stopped.
  2. Then publish the update. If the estimates are updated as the project goes, there is an update to publish. Defence’s page, dated 3 October 2025, still shows only the old range, “under review”.
  3. Jobs are not a price. Asked about overruns, the minister said a strategy and measures are in place, then pointed to jobs. The people in Halifax doing the work are not the subject here. A jobs estimate answers why build in Canada. It does not answer what the ships cost, and his answer does not describe the strategy.
  4. Benefits equal to what? The industrial benefits are pegged to the value of the contracts, and Defence withheld what it has paid Irving. Industry says it does not track centrally whether any obligation under the rule was audited or penalized.

Committed for all phases, October 2024

$871.7M

Counts include tax.

  1. Is this that extension? If the amendment is the extension the release foresaw, nothing on the record says so, and the disclosure gives no reason.
  2. No cost, then a cost. In 2021 the department told Parliament the yard was modernized at no cost to Canada. By 2024 it had committed $871.7M of public money to the yard, for needs it says were found during design.

Our read

The PBO’s price for the fleet

$84.5B

To develop and build, 2022.

This is our judgement on the documented facts above.

A pragmatic person reading these documents would conclude this: Canadians are paying for this fleet without its price. What is published: the contract as signed on 3 March 2025 and as amended for the quarter to 31 March 2026, the cost of the first ships (8 March 2025), and an old range for the fleet marked “under review” (Defence’s page, dated 3 October 2025). What is withheld: what Defence has paid Irving, and the details of the stop-work orders (Q-417, 21 November 2025). What has no published figure or reason: the fleet’s revised total and the $2.74B amendment, in none of the records we searched to 15 October 2026 (the contract disclosure, Defence’s project page, its Capabilities Blueprint and 2026-27 plan, and the PBO’s publications).

These were decisions, and they have owners. Bill Blair at National Defence and Jean-Yves Duclos at procurement held those offices when the contract was signed on 3 March 2025, under Justin Trudeau. Duclos, as procurement minister, and Ginette Petitpas Taylor, as President of the Treasury Board, approved it. David J. McGuinty and Joël Lightbound held them under Mark Carney in the quarter the amendment was reported, January to March 2026. As of 15 October 2026, neither department had published the fleet’s new total or the amendment’s reason in the records above.

The PBO’s cost over the ships’ lives

$306.0B

Development, build, decades of running and disposal, as estimated in 2022. The most recent independent costing we found.

The yard runs the same way at a smaller scale. Irving bid its yard upgrades at no cost to Canada and took the full points for it. After winning, it got a backstop Canada was under no obligation to give. In 2021 Parliament was told the yard was modernized at no cost to Canada. By 2024 Ottawa had committed up to $871.7M to it. Whether that money counts against the backstop, the record does not say. The department that gave Parliament the 2021 line can answer it.

What we’re chasing

The documents that would settle it

  1. Why the contract grew, when, and why the IP field now reads “Crown owned – exception”The amendment itself and the Treasury Board submission behind itRoute: An access request to Public Services and Procurement Canada or National Defence, or an Order Paper question · Status: not public
  2. Whether the amendment, or any later money, pays for the yard, and whether it counts against the backstopThe amendment’s terms, the August 2023 yard amendment to the design contract and its justification, and later Question Period notes on the shipbuilding strategyRoute: An access request or an Order Paper question · Status: not public
  3. What the whole fleet costsThe revised project approval from Treasury Board, Defence’s results reports, or a new PBO costingRoute: A committee or an MP can ask the PBO · Status: not public
  4. Which design work was stopped, and what stopping costThe stop-work ordersRoute: An access request · Status: not public
  5. What Defence has paid IrvingThe payment records withheld from Q-417Route: An access request · Status: not public
  6. What was said in the meetingsThe briefing notes and readouts of the offices met, for those datesRoute: An access request · Status: not public

Sources

Officials met are named with the offices the lobbying filings give them.

The next read

Where the defence money goes, and how much of Ottawa’s NATO count buys a ship.

Read the defence spending breakdown

What changed

  • UpdateThe next-step button keeps room around its words where they wrap on a phone.

  • PublishedPublished: the destroyer contract, who approved it, the price, the yard and the lobbying.